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Abstract 
This paper employs a unique, largely hand-gathered dataset to investigate the 
determinants of both foreign currency (FX) and interest rate (IR) derivatives usage for 
a sample of European non-financial firms. By measuring the extent of usage for those 
that choose to use derivatives, we are able to separately employ a Tobit model and a 
two-part model, which allows the determinants of the usage decision to differ from the 
extent of usage decision. We find that while FX derivatives usage is motivated by 
economies of scale and FX exposure, IR derivatives usage is motivated by the 
magnitude and nature of firms’ debt. We also find that, for both FX and IR derivatives, 
the determinants of the usage decision differ from the determinants of the extent of 
usage decision, which suggests that a two-part model is the most appropriate model 
when examining firms’ derivatives policies. 
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 1. Introduction 
The theories of optimal hedging argue that a range of firm attributes, such as 
its growth opportunities (Froot et al. 1993) or the probability that it will get into 
financial distress (Smith and Stulz 1985), determines derivatives usage. However, 
consideration of the literature pertaining to derivatives usage quickly reveals the 
disparity in empirical findings. Whereas some studies find evidence that agrees with 
the theory, others find evidence that directly contradicts it. For example, 
Visvanathan (1998) finds that firms with higher leverage, hence a higher probability 
of financial distress, have a higher probability of interest rate derivatives usage. 
However, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find that such firms have a lower probability 
of foreign currency derivatives usage. Table 1 breaks down a selection of these 
studies by geographic location of the samples selected, the scope of their 
investigations, and the models employed. 
With respect to scope, the third column illustrates how much of the previous 
research focuses on the determinants of certain classifications of derivatives usage - 
foreign currency (FX), interest rate (IR) or commodity price (CP) - whereas others 
examine general, or aggregate, derivatives usage. Examining general derivatives 
usage presupposes that the different categories of derivatives share common 
determinants. However, if the theories of optimal hedging do not apply equally to 
FX, IR and CP derivatives usage, then they should be disaggregated and examined 
separately. Furthermore, comparisons between different studies should be 
restricted to only those that examine the same classification of derivatives.    
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 The fourth column shows the range of models employed to examine firms’ 
derivatives usage. Studies that exclusively examine the usage decision employ either 
a Logit or a Probit model. Generally, the requirement is that a firm discloses 
derivatives usage, even qualitatively, to be classified as a derivatives user. Hence, 
firms with widely varying magnitudes of derivatives usage are broadly categorized 
as users, which can introduce a large amount of measurement error. Studies that 
examine the extent of firms’ derivatives usage, most commonly measured with gross 
notional amounts, use either a Tobit or a two-part model, which differ in their 
assumptions of firms’ decision processes: those that assume that the binary 
derivatives usage and extent of usage are jointly decided in one step employ the 
Tobit model, whereas those that assume firms decide on the extent of usage only 
after they have decided to use derivatives employ a two-part or hurdle model. 
Perhaps a reason for the apparent disparity in empirical findings is the lack of 
consensus on which model is the most representative of firms’ actual decision 
processes.   
In addition to scope and model employment, studies also vary in their 
selection of explanatory variables. For instance, of the nine studies that examine the 
determinants of FX derivatives usage in Table 1, only five control for FX exposure 
with some measure for foreign sales (Allayannis and Ofek 2001, Bartram et al. 2009, 
Elliott et al. 2003, Géczy et al. 1997, Muller and Verschoor 2005). Of the six studies 
that examine the determinants of IR derivatives usage, none attempt to directly 
control for IR exposure beyond using the leverage ratio. Only Graham and Rogers 
(2002), who examine the determinants of general derivatives usage, include a proxy 
 for interest rate exposure in the sum of short-term and floating rate debt (as a 
percentage of total debt).  
This study contributes to the literature in five ways. Firstly, we use a 
European sample. As Table 1 illustrates, the majority of the previous empirical work 
examining derivatives usage is US-based. Before the introduction of IAS39 in 1998, 
European firms disclosed relatively little information on risk management, perhaps 
viewing it as a competitive advantage. Hence, few empirical studies have examined 
the determinants of derivatives usage in a European context. Of those that have, 
Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999), De Ceuster et al. (2000) and Bodnar et al. (2013) 
examine survey data from German, Belgian, Dutch and Italian firms, respectively. Of 
the previous studies that use data gathered directly from firms’ annual reports, only 
Muller and Verschoor (2005) examine the determinants for an exclusively European 
sample, whereas Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009) and Lel (2012) include European 
firms in global samples.1 
Secondly, we examine the determinants of FX and IR derivatives separately, 
in addition to general derivatives usage. We find that some variables are statistically 
significant determinants of FX but not IR derivatives usage, and vice versa. In some 
cases, variables have the opposite effect on FX and IR derivatives usage. We show 
that, were we to solely examine the determinants of general derivatives usage, the 
significance of these variables is weakened or lost entirely.  
Thirdly, we model firms’ derivatives usage with a Tobit model and a two-part 
model separately. With respect to the two-part model, we find in some instances 
                                                        
1 For example, Lel (2012) includes only European firms that cross-list on a US exchange. Consequently, there are almost twice 
as many Irish firms (48) than there are German firms (28) in the sample. There is one Spanish firm, one Belgian firm and none 
from either Austria or Portugal. 
 that variables are statistically significant determinants of the usage decision but not 
the extent of usage decision, and vice versa, lending support to the hypothesis that 
firms make their derivatives decisions in two separate steps. Similar to above, we 
show that our ability to detect these effects would have been weakened were we to 
restrict our analysis to a Tobit model, which assumes a one-step decision process.  
Fourthly, many previous studies are constrained by their use of accounting 
data that are readily available from databases such as Compustat and DataStream. 
Whilst such data are similarly used here, they are augmented with hand-gathered 
data on firms’ notional derivatives usage, as well as various explanatory variables 
such as FX exposure, IR exposure, debt maturity, and tax loss carry forwards. This 
process minimizes bias with respect to both measurement error and omitted 
variables, and aligns our proxies with the theoretical firm attributes that they are 
designed to represent.  
Lastly, if a two-step process is the most suitable model to examine firms’ 
derivatives usage then an important question has remained unanswered in the 
literature as to whether sample selection bias is present or not. In order to 
accurately investigate sample selection bias, one needs to identify an exclusion 
restriction, that is, there should be at least one independent variable that 
determines derivatives usage that does not affect the extent of usage. For this 
purpose, we manually gather a bespoke measure of variable executive 
compensation and argue that risk-averse managers with compensation that is 
variable in nature are more likely to use derivatives even when it is suboptimal to 
do so, but are unable to increase their derivatives usage with increasing variable 
 compensation because this would signal their suboptimal behavior. We find no 
evidence that sample selection is present although this is caveated by the lack of 
statistical significance on the exclusion restriction.  
This paper proceeds as follows: Sections 2 and 3 discuss the sample creation 
and data collection processes, respectively. Section 4 describes the assumptions that 
underpin both the Tobit and two-part models. Section 5 reports the results of both 
the Tobit and two-part models, whereas Section 6 reports the results of the 
Heckman model, which investigates if sample selection bias is present. Section 7 
concludes.   
 
2. Sample Construction 
The sample comprises firms from the original eleven Eurozone member 
states – Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain that are listed on the European Union DataStream 
Index. The number of stocks for each country is determined by the size of the 
market and the sample covers 75-80% of total market capitalization for that 
country.2 DataStream reviews index constituents quarterly and re-sets them to 
represent the new top group of stocks by market value. The sample represents 
those firms included in the index in December 2010. The initial sample comprised 
1209 firms. Two annual reports were sourced from the “investor relations” section 
of each firm’s official website for the fiscal years ending in 2009 and 2010. The 
criteria for remaining in the sample are as follows: 
                                                        
2 DataStream Global Equity Indices User Guide, Issue 5, p8. 
  Must be a non-financial firm. Financial firms excluded from the sample are 
banks, building societies, insurance and real estate firms. Quasi-financial entities 
such as buyout, royalties and licensing firms are also excluded.  
 Full, machine-readable, annual reports must be available, including notes to the 
accounts. 
 Firms’ annual reports must be available in English. 
 Firms must report in Euro. 
 Accounts must be prepared in compliance with IFRS. 
Financial firms were excluded because they could be market makers in the 
derivatives and debt markets. This is standard practice in the literature pertaining 
to derivatives usage (see Géczy et al., 1997; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Graham and 
Rogers, 2002; Bartram et al., 2009). The final sample, after eliminating on the basis 
of the above criteria, comprised 710 non-financial firms, which, over two years, 
equals 1420 firm-year observations. Table 2 provides a breakdown of derivatives 
usage by country, industry and firm size (total assets) for the pooled sample. Firms 
are classified as FX derivatives users if they disclose the usage of FX forwards, 
futures, options or cross currency swaps. Firms are described as IR derivatives 
users if they disclose the usage of IR options, IR swaps, floating rate agreements 
(FRAs), caps, floors or cross currency swaps.3  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
                                                        
3 Geczy et al. (1997) classify cross currency swaps as FX derivatives. Borokhovich et al. (2004) classify them as IR derivatives. 
Hence, in this study, similar to Guay and Kothari (2003), cross currency swaps are classified as both FX and IR derivatives to 
avoid underestimation of either. 
 Of the 1420 firm-year observations, 917 (64.6%) are FX derivatives users. 
This compares with Géczy et al. (1997), who find that only 41% of US firms used FX 
derivatives in 1991, and Bartram et al. (2009), who find that 51% of European firms 
used FX derivatives in 2001. 948 (66.8%) are IR derivatives users. This compares 
with Borokhovich et al. (2004), who find that only 49% of US firms used IR 
derivatives in 1995, and Bartram et al. (2009), who find that 32% of European firms 
used IR derivatives in 2001.  
The uppermost section of Table 2 shows the results of partitioning the 
sample by country. With respect to FX derivatives, usage rates are higher for firms 
from central and northern Europe: 73% (630/858) of observations from Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg use FX derivatives. The Netherlands 
bucks this trend with only 54% usage. This compares with only 50% (213/426) of 
firms from Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain using FX derivatives. With respect to IR 
derivatives, usage is more evenly balanced across countries. Almost 80% of French 
and 65% of German firms, the two largest countries in the sample, are IR derivatives 
users. Firms from the Netherlands were the least frequent users of IR derivatives 
with 47% usage. Our results are therefore very similar to those found in previous 
studies using survey data with Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) finding that 78% of 
German firms use derivatives, De Ceuster et al. (2000) finding that 79% of Belgian 
firms use derivatives, whereas Bodnar et al. (2003) finds that only 60% of Dutch 
firms use derivatives and Bodnar et al. (2013) finds that only 56% (65%) of Italian 
firms use FX (IR) derivatives.   
 The middle section of Table 2 partitions the sample by industry. FX 
derivatives usage rates are highest for consumer goods (77%) and basic materials 
(73%) firms. In contrast, usage rates are lowest for telecommunications (53%) and 
technology (41%) firms. Géczy et al. (1997) similarly find that consumer goods 
(66%) firms had the highest percentage of FX derivatives users in 1991. Bartram et 
al. (2009) find that automobiles (62%) and chemical (69%) firms had the highest 
percentage of FX derivatives users in 2001. In this study, automobile firms are 
classified as consumer goods firms and chemical firms are classified as basic 
materials firms, according to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). It would 
therefore appear that, over time, the same types of firms, namely consumer goods 
and basic materials, have the highest percentages of FX derivatives usage. With 
respect to IR derivatives, usage is more evenly balanced across industries, with the 
exception of utilities firms, 91% of which are IR users. The next most frequent users 
of IR derivatives are industrials (71%), consumer goods (70%) and 
telecommunications (69%) firms. Bartram et al. (2009) similarly find that, at 62%, 
utilities firms have the highest percentage of IR derivatives users in 2001. 
Borokhovich et al. (2004), who use a different industry classification system that 
does not include utilities firms, find that communications (60%) and food & tobacco 
(56%) firms had the highest percentages of IR users in 1995. In our sample, 
communications firms are classified as telecommunications firms and food & 
tobacco firms are classified as consumer goods firms. Hence, similar to our findings 
in relation to FX derivatives usage, it would therefore appear that, over time, the 
 same types of firms, namely utilities and consumer goods firms, have the highest 
percentages of IR derivatives usage.  
The lowermost section of Table 2 shows the results of partitioning the 
sample by size. The largest firms are clearly the most prolific users of both FX and IR 
derivatives: 88% of the quartile of largest observations are FX derivatives users, in 
contrast to just 33% of the quartile of smallest firms. Similarly, 87% of the quartile 
of largest observations are IR derivatives users, in contrast to just 39% of the 
quartile of smallest firms. Both Géczy et al. (1997) and Borokhovich et al. (2004) 
find similarly with FX derivatives and IR derivatives usage, respectively, with 
increasing firm size although the percentages are noticeably smaller. For instance, 
Géczy et al. (1997) find that 75% of the quartile of largest firms used FX derivatives 
in 1991, in contrast with 17% of the quartile of smallest firms. Borokhovich et al. 
(2004) find that 67% of the quartile of largest firms used IR derivatives in 1995, in 
contrast with 31% of the quartile of smallest firms. Our results therefore show that, 
as well as larger firms being more likely to use derivatives, the proportion of firms 
using derivatives has shifted upwards across firms of all sizes over the last twenty 
years.     
 
3. Data  
3.1 Dependent variables  
Gross notional FX derivatives: As a continuous measure of the extent of FX 
derivatives usage we manually gathered the total notional value of FX derivatives 
 from the notes to the accounts, and scaled by total assets.4 As above, FX derivatives 
are defined as all forwards, futures, options and cross-currency swaps. Similar to 
Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009), the search terms used were “derivative”, “fair 
value”, “notional”, “reference”, “nominal”, “hedg*”, “swap”, “forward”, “foreign”, 
“currency” and “option”.  
Usage of the total, or gross, notional value of FX derivatives (or any category 
of derivatives) is not without contention. As Smith Jr (1995) point out, two firms 
with identical notional amounts of derivatives but different terms can have different 
levels of hedging. For example, consider two call options with the same notional 
amount but different strike prices. One is deep-in-the-money and the other is deep-
out-of-the-money. The former option thus provides a much better hedge of the 
underlying exposure. Hence, the notional principal gives only an approximate 
estimation of derivatives ownership. Moreover, as Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and 
Graham and Rogers (2002) point out, if firms have offsetting or aggregate positions, 
the total notional amount will not effectively gauge derivatives ownership. 
Nonetheless, most of the previous studies that use a continuous measure of firm’s 
derivatives usage use the total notional amount (Allayannis and Ofek 2001, 
Borokhovich et al. 2004, Gay and Nam 1998, Graham and Rogers 2002, Hentschel 
and Kothari 2001, Howton and Perfect 1998, Lel 2012, Muller and Verschoor 2005). 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001, p.96) justify the usage of total notional amount as 
follows: although one would expect financial firms to hold offsetting positions to run 
a “balanced book”, non-financial firms have no obvious reason to hold offsetting 
                                                        
4 The results of all subsequent tests are robust to the scaling of notional FX derivatives (and IR derivatives) by total sales 
rather than total assets. The results of these tests are available from the authors on request.  
 derivatives positions. Consequently, similar to these studies, we proxy for the extent 
of firms’ FX derivatives usage using the gross notional value of FX derivatives, scaled 
by total assets. 
Usable data is obtained for 1297 out of 1420 firm-year observations, 759 FX 
derivatives users and 538 non-users.5 Descriptive statistics for this and all the other 
variables are provided in Table 3. The mean level of notional FX derivatives usage 
scaled by total assets is 8.1%. This compares with Howton and Perfect (1998) at 9%, 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) at 3%, and Graham and Rogers (2002) at 8%. Allayannis 
and Ofek’s (2001) markedly lower figure can, in part at least, be explained by the 
fact that only 42% (159/372) of the firms in their sample report non-zero notional 
FX derivatives usage, compared with 59% (759/1297) of the firms in this sample.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Gross notional IR derivatives: Similar to FX derivatives, as a continuous 
measure of the extent of IR derivatives usage we manually gathered the total 
notional value of IR derivatives, scaled by total assets. As above, IR derivatives are 
defined as all IR options, IR swaps, floating rate agreements (FRAs), caps, floors and 
cross currency swaps. The search terms used were “derivative”, “fair value”, 
“notional”, “reference”, “nominal”, “hedg*”, “swap”, “floating”, “variable”, “rate”, 
“cap”, “floor” and “option”.  
                                                        
5 In Section 2, the criteria for being classified as an FX derivatives user is simply qualitative disclosure of usage anywhere in 
the annual report. This is standard practice in the literature examining the binary usage decision so we use the same 
methodology to produce Table 2, which can be directly compared to such studies (e.g. Bartram et al., 2009, Géczy et al., 1997). 
Using these criteria, we find 917 users and 503 non-users of FX derivatives. However, when manually gathering data on the 
notional amount of FX derivatives usage, we find that, of the 917 observations classified as users, 123 do not disclose a 
notional amount. A further 35 observations qualitatively disclose FX derivatives usage somewhere in the annual report but 
then report a zero notional amount in the notes to the accounts. Consequently, we have usable notional data on 1297 
observations, 759 of which are FX derivatives users and 538 are non-users. This is standard practice among previous studies 
that use a continuous measure of derivatives usage (e.g. Gay and Nam, 1998, Graham and Rogers, 2002).   
 Usable data is obtained for 1308 firm-year observations, 829 IR derivatives 
users and 479 non-users. The mean level of notional IR derivatives usage scaled by 
total assets is 9.9%. This compares with Howton and Perfect (1998) at 14%, Graham 
and Rogers (2002) at 11%, and Borokhovich et al. (2004) at 9.2%.  
 
3.2 Independent variables 
 The Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance proposition shows that, in 
perfect capital markets, corporate financing decisions cannot affect the value of a 
firm. In reality, however, markets are not perfect and taxes, agency costs, 
bankruptcy costs, transaction costs and information asymmetries can make it 
beneficial for the firm to hedge its risks. Thus, most of the theories on what makes it 
optimal for a firm to use derivatives introduce some form of friction into the 
assumption of perfect capital markets. These are broadly defined as the theories of 
optimal hedging and include underinvestment costs and financial distress costs.  
Underinvestment costs: As future cash flows are uncertain, the availability of 
internal funds to finance future projects varies significantly. Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993) argue that hedging lowers the probability of low cash flows, which 
helps to ensure that the firm has sufficient internal funds to invest in such projects 
where such funds might otherwise be scarce. Firms with investment opportunities, 
or growth opportunities, will therefore benefit from using derivatives. In this study, 
the market-to-book ratio, R&D expenditures and capital expenditures are used to 
proxy for firms’ growth opportunities. A positive relationship is hypothesized 
between all three proxies and derivatives usage. Data for each are available on 
 DataStream WorldScope, the calculations and sources of which are presented in 
Table 4.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Costs of financial distress: The payment obligations associated with debt 
financing can increase the probability of financial distress if cash flows are 
insufficient to meet them (Shapiro and Titman 1986). This could lead to limitations 
in further borrowing, reputational damage, the breakdown of relationships with 
suppliers, the loss of customers, the distraction of management attention, risk 
premia in the form of higher employee compensation, and, in the event of 
bankruptcy, accounting and legal fees (Aretz and Bartram 2010). This probability of 
such events occurring is an increasing function of leverage. Smith and Stulz (1985) 
argue that, as derivatives usage decreases the probability of realizing these left tail 
outcomes, it lowers the expected costs of financial distress. This study focuses on 
leverage and seven additional firm characteristics as proxies for the costs of 
financial distress: operating margin, quick ratio, dividend yield, asset tangibility, 
firm size, debt maturity and tax loss carry forwards.  
To the extent that higher leverage increases the likelihood of financial 
distress, a positive relationship is expected with derivatives usage. Less profitable 
and less liquid firms are also more likely to have difficulty meeting their payment 
obligations so a negative relation is hypothesized between both operating margin 
and derivatives usage, and the quick ratio and derivatives usage. The dividend yield 
could provide an alternative proxy for liquidity in that firms that pay out low 
dividends have more funds available to pay fixed claims (Nance et al. 1993). Lower 
 dividend paying firms have less need to hedge to avoid financial distress so a 
positive relationship would therefore be expected with derivatives usage. With 
respect to asset tangibility, Howton and Perfect (1998) argue that if a firm is forced 
to liquidate its assets, tangible assets are easier to sell at near book value than 
intangible assets that are only valuable if the firm continues as a going concern. 
Hence, a negative relationship is predicted with derivatives usage. From a firm size 
point of view, Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) argue that, since smaller firms 
incur higher proportional bankruptcy costs, they are more likely to use derivatives. 
This implies a negative relationship between firm size and derivatives usage. On the 
other hand, large firms might exhibit economies of scale using derivatives, which 
would imply a positive relationship. The empirical evidence with respect to size 
unanimously supports the economies of scale incentive to use derivatives (Berkman 
and Bradbury 1996, Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley and Simkins 2004, Fok et al. 
1997, Géczy, Minton and Schrand 1997, Graham and Rogers 2002, Guay 1999, Judge 
2006, Lel 2012, Lin and Smith 2007, Mian 1996, Nance, Smith and Smithson 1993, 
Rogers 2002). 
While the data needed to measure the above variables are available on 
DataStream, data on debt maturity and tax loss carry forwards were manually 
collected from firms’ annual reports. With respect to debt maturity, previous studies 
generally use the fraction of debt that is due after a certain period as a measure of 
debt maturity.6 Titman (1992) builds a theoretical model in which borrowers with 
favorable private information about future prospects prefer short-term debt as the 
                                                        
6 Visvanathan (1998) finds that debt maturity (fraction of debt maturing after two years) has a negative relationship with IR 
derivatives usage. However Bartram et al. (2009) find that debt maturity (fraction of debt maturing after one year) has a 
positive relationship with IR derivatives usage.   
 debt can be re-priced when new information becomes available. However, short-
term debt increases liquidity risk and the probability of financial distress. Firms 
with short-term debt are therefore predicted to be more likely to use derivatives. In 
order to minimize measurement error, we use a bespoke, manually gathered 
measure that utilizes firms’ annual report disclosures to the full extent. As per the 
calculation in Table 4, we take the fraction of a firm’s debt that matures in less than 
1 year and weigh it by the midpoint between 0 and 1 year, i.e. 0.5 years. Similarly, 
we take the fraction of debt that matures between 1 and 5 years and weigh it at its 
midpoint, i.e. 3 years. Lastly, the fraction of debt that matures after 5 years is 
weighed at 7.5 years.7 The search terms used to find the relevant section of the 
annual reports were “maturit*”, “schedule”, “liquidity risk”, “financial liabil*” and 
“less than”.  
With respect to tax loss carry forwards, Graham and Rogers (2002) argue 
that if firms face convex tax schedules, derivatives usage reduces the expected tax 
liability by reducing the volatility of pretax profits. Convex tax schedules can arise 
directly through progressive marginal tax rates or indirectly through tax shields 
such as tax loss carry forwards. Hence a positive relationship is hypothesized with 
derivatives usage. Alternatively, Judge (2006) suggests that tax loss carry forwards 
can be used to identify firms that have recently suffered from or are currently 
experiencing financial distress, again implying a positive relationship with 
derivatives usage. We manually gather data on the magnitude of tax loss carry 
forwards from annual report disclosures, similar to Graham and Rogers (2002) and 
                                                        
7 For example, a firm for whom one third of their total debt matures within 1 year and two thirds between 1 and 5 years would 
have a debt maturity of (0.33)*(0.5) + (0.67)*(3) = 2.167 years.   
 Lin and Smith (2007). The search terms used were “tax loss”, “carry forward”, 
“carried forward”, “carry forward”, “losses”, “deferred tax” and “deferred”.  
Market exposure: Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) suggests that, while 
capital market imperfections are necessary to justify FX derivatives usage, a firm’s 
ultimate decision also depends on sufficiently large exposure to FX risk. As such, 
several of the previous studies that examine the determinants of derivatives usage, 
FX or otherwise, include proxies for FX exposure such as foreign sales, foreign assets 
and foreign debt in their respective models (Allayannis and Ofek 2001, Bartram, 
Brown and Fehle 2009, Elliott, Huffman and Makar 2003, Géczy, Minton and 
Schrand 1997, Graham and Rogers 2002, Judge 2006, Muller and Verschoor 2005, 
Muller and Verschoor 2006).8 In this study, we manually gather data on both foreign 
sales and foreign debt from firms’ annual reports. The search terms used to find the 
relevant section on the geographical segmentation of sales were “geographic 
segment”, “geograph”, “sales by”, “sales”, “revenues by”, “revenues”, “by region”, 
“region”, “by segment”, “segment”, and “currenc*. Similarly, the search terms used to 
find the geographical segmentation of debt were “financial liabil*”, “interest 
bearing”, “currencies”, “liquidity risk” and “currenc*”.  
 Of the previous studies that examine the determinants of derivatives usage, 
IR or otherwise, only Graham and Rogers (2002) attempt to control for IR exposure. 
The authors include the sum of short term and variable rate debt (as a percentage of 
total debt) as an explanatory variable and find a positive, albeit statistically 
                                                        
8 The level of foreign sales, for example, is a measure of FX exposure that is ex ante derivatives usage. Ex post measures of FX 
exposure include Muller and Verschoor’s (2006) augmented market model, which measures the effect of FX movements on the 
value of the firm. This measures a firm’s exposure after using derivatives and is therefore unsuitable in the context of this 
study.   
 insignificant, relationship with general derivatives usage. In this study, variable rate 
debt scaled by total debt is used as a proxy for IR exposure. As with the proxies for 
FX exposure, this data is manually gathered from firms’ annual reports. The search 
terms used were “variable rate”, “variable interest”, “floating rate”, “floating 
interest”, “fixed rate”, “fixed interest”, “floating”, “variable” and “fixed”.  
 
4. Model Selection 
Corporate risk management research is often concerned with the 
determinants of firms’ derivatives usage. However, the extent of derivatives usage 
can only be observed for firms that use derivatives. Thus, the model chosen must 
accommodate a limited, or censored, dependent variable. As Woodridge (2010, 
p.517) points out, there are two types of censoring: 1) true censoring, whereby a 
data problem precludes observation above or below some value for some part of the 
population and 2) a corner solution outcome, whereby the  independent variable is 
an observable choice or outcome. Examples of corner solutions are an individual’s 
expenditure on life insurance or a firm’s expenditure on R&D. For some individuals 
and firms, the optimal choice will be the corner solution, i.e. zero expenditures. The 
model that Wooldridge (2010, p.519) prescribes for such a situation is the Tobit 
model. Hence, previous studies that model firms’ derivatives usage with a Tobit 
model implicitly assume that a firm’s choice not to use derivatives is optimal to that 
particular firm, i.e. derivatives usage does not add value.  Thus, within the Tobit 
model is the very strong assumption that the same stochastic process determines 
both whether the dependent variable is greater than zero and the value of the 
 dependent variable conditional on it being greater than zero. In other words, one 
single decision governs the usage of derivatives and the extent of usage.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Haushalter (2000), on the other hand, suggests that the decision to use 
derivatives might instead be made in two steps: First, a firm must decide to use 
derivatives. Then, if it decides to use, it must determine the extent of usage. Dolde 
and Mishra (2007) describe this first step as a qualitative decision. For those that 
decide to use derivatives, a second, quantitative decision governs the extent of 
usage. Consequently, a two-part model (or hurdle model) would be more 
appropriate, with each part having separate determinants. Greene (2006, p713) 
refers to the subset of firms that do not use derivatives as not censored but instead 
“incidentally truncated”. This scenario can be modeled with two equations; a 
selection equation describing derivatives usage followed by a truncated OLS 
regression describing the extent of derivatives usage. The selection equation is: 
 
  
          (1) 
 
where zi* is a latent variable representing the utility of a firm entering a derivatives 
program, wi is a vector of factors known to determine a firm’s decision to use 
derivatives, and ui is the error term. The latent variable is not observed but an 
indicator variable, zi, is, such that: 
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Given the dichotomous nature of zi, the first step can be modeled with a probit 
regression. The second step, truncated OLS regression is: 
 
 (  |    )           (2) 
 
where yi is the gross notional amount of derivatives, xi is a vector of factors known 
to determine the extent the extent of derivatives usage, and εi is the error term.  
 In the next section, we examine the determinants of firms’ FX and IR 
derivatives usage, as well as general derivatives usage, using both the Tobit and the 
two-part model. Section 6 examines firms’ derivatives usage with Heckman’s model, 
which detects and corrects for sample selection bias.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Tobit Model 
 Table 5 presents the results of the Tobit model, where the determinants of 
firms’ general, FX and IR derivatives usage are examined. It is immediately 
noteworthy that, from a possible 1420 firm observations, the sample size, N, is 
reduced to 581 (general derivatives) due to the non-uniformity of firms’ annual 
report disclosures. For instance, we have usable data on 1209 firm-year 
observations for our proxy for FX exposure, foreign sales (as per Table 3, Panel A). 
Similarly, we have usable data on only 860 observations for our proxy for interest 
rate exposure, variable rate debt. Hence, the number of observations for which we 
 have full data is reduced - an unavoidable consequence of using annual report 
disclosures to manually construct variables.  
The positive coefficients on size (0.042) and leverage (0.121) are both 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that larger, more levered firms have a higher 
level of general derivatives usage, thus lending support to the economies of scale 
and costs of financial distress motives for using derivatives. Firms with higher 
market-to-book ratios exhibit a higher level of general derivatives usage, in support 
of the underinvestment costs motive. However, firms with higher profitability, as 
proxied by the operating margin, have a higher level of general derivatives usage, 
contradicting theoretical predictions. Lastly, we find evidence, albeit weak at the 
10% significance level, that firms with higher interest rate exposure, as proxied by 
variable rate debt, exhibit a higher level of general derivatives usage.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
However, when we disaggregate general derivatives into FX and IR 
derivatives, we find that the only determinant that has the same effect on FX and IR 
derivatives usage is firm size, which has a positive effect on both. With respect to FX 
derivatives, the positive coefficient on foreign sales (0.170) suggests that firms with 
higher FX exposure use a higher level. Consistent with theoretical predictions but 
contrary to the findings with respect to general derivatives, we find evidence, albeit 
weak, that firms with lower profitability use a higher level of derivatives. The 
positive coefficient on asset tangibility (0.088) is contrary to that predicted by 
Howton and Perfect (1998). One possible explanation is that firms with lower asset 
tangibility are more operationally hedged insofar as they can shift operations in 
 response to FX movements so have less need to use FX derivatives. This is also 
evident in Table 2 whereby knowledge-based technology firms have the lowest 
usage of FX derivatives and asset-intensive basic materials, consumer goods and 
industrials firms have the highest usage. 
With respect to IR derivatives, the positive coefficient on variable rate debt 
(0.084) suggests that firms with higher IR exposure use a higher level. The 
remaining capital structure variables, the leverage ratio and debt maturity, also 
determine the level of IR derivatives usage, although in the latter’s case it is opposite 
to that predicted by the theory. Contrary to the findings with respect to FX 
derivatives, we find that firms with lower FX exposure and higher profitability use a 
higher level of IR derivatives. Firms with higher market to book ratios and lower 
quick ratios also use a higher level of IR derivatives, consistent with the 
underinvestment costs and financial distress costs theories of optimal hedging, 
respectively. However, contrary to theoretical predictions, the coefficients on 
dividend yield and tax loss carry forwards are both negative. On the whole, Table 5 
illustrates the need to disaggregate general derivatives usage to isolate the singular 
effect that certain variables have on either FX or IR derivatives usage.  
 
5.2 Two-Part Model 
 Table 6 presents the results of the two-part model. As outlined in Section 4, 
the two-part model allows the determinants of the usage and extent of usage 
decisions to differ. Hence, for general, FX and IR derivatives, we examine the 
determinants of the usage decision with a probit model and the extent of usage 
 decision with a truncated OLS model. With respect to FX derivatives, the middle 
section of Table 6 shows that while firm size, foreign sales, low profitability and 
asset tangibility strongly predict the usage of FX derivatives, firm size is the sole 
determinant of the extent of derivatives usage. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) similarly 
find that, while many variables determine the FX derivatives usage decision, only 
firm size and foreign sales determine the extent of usage. Also similar to this study, 
the authors find that firms with higher leverage are less likely to use FX derivatives, 
contrary to theoretical predictions. This could be indicative of firms using leverage 
as an alternative means to hedge FX exposure than FX derivatives, although we find 
that the level of foreign debt is not statistically significant.9 On the whole, our results 
lend support to the theory that firms manage FX risk in a two-part decision process; 
first, whether or not to use FX derivatives, then second, how much to use. 
With respect to IR derivatives, the positive coefficients on the leverage ratio 
and IR exposure, as proxied by variable rate debt, in the first stage probit regression 
are both consistent with theoretical predictions. However, the positive coefficient on 
debt maturity in the first stage suggests that firms with short-term debt are less 
likely to use IR derivatives, similar to Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009) but 
contrary to the theory. The negative coefficient on the quick ratio in the probit 
regression strongly suggests that less liquid firms are more likely to use IR 
derivatives. With respect to firm size, the positive coefficient implies that economies 
of scale motivate the IR derivatives usage decision. Lastly, the negative coefficient 
on tax loss carry forwards runs counter to theoretical predictions. 
                                                        
9 A money market hedge, whereby a firm can issue foreign debt to hedge foreign currency receivables, is equivalent, and 
therefore an alternative means to selling the receivables forward using FX derivatives (Aabo, 2006; Clark and Judge, 2008, 
2009; Elliott et al, 2003).   
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
With respect to the extent of IR derivatives usage decision, we find the 
leverage ratio and variable rate debt are both positively related to the extent of IR 
derivatives usage decision, as they are for the binary usage decision and consistent 
with theoretical predictions. However, we find conflicting evidence for the 
underinvestment costs motive. Whereas the positive coefficient on the market-to-
book ratio is as predicted, the negative coefficient on the R&D ratio is contrary to 
theoretical predictions. Regarding the financial distress costs motive, both the 
positive coefficient on operating margin and the negative coefficient on dividend 
yield also run contrary to theoretical predictions. Recall that the financial distress 
costs motive for hedging predicts that firms with lower profitability and higher 
dividends will hedge more. Again, similar to the FX derivatives specification, our 
results support the theory that firms manage IR risk in a two-part decision process. 
Table 6 also highlights the importance of disaggregating general derivatives 
into its FX and IR counterparts. For example, the coefficient on leverage (-0.284) is 
statistically insignificant in the probit model for general derivatives, suggesting that 
the decision to use derivatives is not determined by leverage. However, by 
disaggregating general into FX and IR, we find that leverage has the opposite effect 
on both: the negative coefficient on leverage (-0.556) is statistically significant at the 
10% level in the FX derivatives specification, whereas the positive coefficient on 
leverage (0.544) is statistically significant at the 5% level in the IR derivatives 
specification. Had we not separately examined the determinants of FX and IR 
derivatives, one might conclude that leverage has no effect on a firm’s decision to 
 use derivatives. Similarly, with respect to the extent of usage, the coefficient on size 
(-0.006) is statistically insignificant in the truncated OLS model for IR derivatives, 
whereas size (0.015) is significant at the 5% level for FX derivatives. Had we just 
measured general derivatives, the positive coefficient on size (0.019) might lead one 
to conclude that economies of scale motivate the extent of firms’ general derivatives 
usage, rather than FX derivatives alone.      
 
6. Robustness Testing 
6.1 Sample Selection Bias 
Sample selection bias can occur when unobserved firm characteristics 
influence both the usage and extent of usage decisions.10 These unobserved 
characteristics enter equations (1) and (2) through the error terms, ui and εi, 
respectively (Section 4). In the context of derivatives usage, Dionne and Triki (2005) 
find that the education level of firms’ directors is an important determinant of the 
hedging level for a small sample of gold mining firms. However, from an empiricist’s 
point of view, the quality of that education or the managers’ ability, both of which 
could also be argued to determine derivatives usage, are difficult, if not impossible, 
to measure. If such unobserved factors are important factors in a firm’s hedging 
decisions, it will select into the sample of derivatives users due to high values for ui, 
and not because they have high values for observable firm characteristics such as FX 
exposure (foreign sales). Therefore, in the sample of users in equation (2), the level 
of, say, unobserved financial education would be higher among those firms with low 
                                                        
10 In a study on market wages and labor supply, Heckman (1974) suggests that unobserved factors such as ability and quality 
of schooling could affect both the decision to work and the wages of those who decide to work.   
 FX exposure than the level of unobserved financial education with high FX exposure. 
FX exposure and financial education will therefore be negatively correlated for the 
sample of derivatives users, which could lead to biased estimates of βi in equation 
(2). 
The first step Heckman’s selection model is estimated using a probit model 
as it is in the two-part model. The difference with Heckman’s model is that the 
predicted probabilities of derivatives usage are retained for each observation and an 
inverse Mills ratio, λi, is calculated for each. This is then included as an additional 
explanatory variable in the second step of Heckman’s model, which is again a 
truncated OLS regression, where the dependent variable is the extent of derivatives 
usage: 
 
 (  |    )           (    )      (3)          
 
Equation (3) now produces consistent estimates of βi (Greene, 2003, p783). After 
estimation, the presence and direction of selection bias is inferred from a simple t-
test on the significance of the estimated coefficient of λi,    (Greene, 2006, p714).  
 However, Sartori (2003) argues that there should be at least one 
independent variable in the selection equation that is not in the OLS regression.11 
Consider the case where the variables that determine derivatives usage, wi, are 
identical to the variables that determine the extent of usage, xi. Hence, when xi = wi, 
xi enters equation (3) linearly (the first term) and near linearly through a simple 
                                                        
11 Achen (1986, p99) exemplifies such an “exclusion restriction” with college admissions: whether or not a student’s parents 
attended a certain college affects admission (the selection equation) but not the student’s performance after being admitted. 
 function of xi in the inverse Mills ratio. Equation (4) is therefore likely to suffer from 
multicollinearity.12  
While we acknowledge the difficulty in identifying a perfect candidate, i.e. 
one that theoretically determines a firm’s binary derivatives usage decision but not 
the extent of usage decision, we construct a bespoke proxy for managerial risk 
aversion for this purpose. We argue that shareholders would likely condone 
managers implementing or maintaining a derivatives program even though it could 
be motivated by managerial risk aversion rather than value maximization. Indeed, 
Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that it pays to let such managers hedge as the 
reduction in risk increases the incentive to accept risky, but positive NPV, projects. 
Lel (2012) finds confirmatory evidence that managerial share ownership increases 
the likelihood of derivatives usage.  
On the other hand, we contend that the managers of derivatives users would 
be unable to justify increasing the extent of usage with increasing share ownership 
as this would signal their sub-optimal, value damaging behavior to shareholders. 
Indeed, several studies find that the extent of derivatives usage is unaffected by 
managerial share ownership (Allayannis and Ofek 2001, Gay and Nam 1998, Knopf 
et al. 2002, Marsden and Prevost 2005).  
Thus, we hypothesize that, while the binary derivatives usage decision is 
determined by managerial risk aversion in the form of variable rate compensation, 
the extent of usage is unaffected for those that use. To that end, we manually gather 
                                                        
12 Bushway et al. (2007, p163) point out that because the inverse Mills ratio is calculated using a non-linear probit model, λβ 
will not be perfectly correlated with xi. However, “the probit model will be linear for mid-values values of X, and is truly non-
linear only when X takes on extreme values. As evidence of this problem, scholars often report very high correlations between 
λ and regressors in the substantive equation.” 
 data and measure managerial risk aversion as the percentage of annual managerial 
compensation that is variable, including shares, option and bonus awards.  
 
6.2 Results 
Table 7 shows that the inverse Mills ratio is statistically insignificant in all 
three Heckman models, examining general, FX and IR derivatives usage. We 
therefore find no evidence that sample selection bias is present, that is, the 
determinants of the extent of firms’ derivatives usage are unbiased by the 
probability of using derivatives. This implies that we are not ignoring any 
unobserved/immeasurable variables that could influence firms’ selection into the 
group of derivatives users. However, of immediate concern to the model 
specification is the lack of statistical significance on the exclusion restriction, 
variable executive compensation, in the first step, probit model. This suggests that 
our instrument has limited explanatory power with respect to a firms’ binary usage 
decision and is therefore weak. If the instrument is weak, multicollinearity is likely 
to persist. To measure the degree of multicollinearity in equation 3, the extent of 
usage equation, we employ variance inflation factors (VIFs). VIFs measure how 
much the variance, and hence the standard errors, are inflated by the existence of 
correlation among the independent variables in the model. The general rules of 
thumb are that a VIF of 1 for an independent variable means that there is little 
correlation between that independent variable and the remaining independent 
variables, a VIF of 4 warrants further investigation, and a VIF of 10 is a sign of 
severe multicollinearity (Hair et al. 2009, Marquaridt 1970, Mason et al. 2003).  On 
 running this diagnostic, we find that the inverse Mills ratio has a VIF of 8.01, 
confirming that the instrument is weak.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Although we find no evidence of sample selection bias with respect to 
corporate firms’ usage of derivatives, importantly, we cannot deny its presence due 
to multicollinearity. None of the previous studies that use the Heckman selection 
and conclude that sample selection is not present report attempts to identify the 
usage decision (Barton 2001, Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley and Simkins 2004, 
Lel 2012). Nonetheless, without any evidence of sample selection bias, the 
appropriate model is the simple two-part model without correction as per Figure 1.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 In this study, we use a unique sample with manually gathered data to 
investigate what motivates European firms’ derivatives usage. We differentiate 
between FX and IR derivatives, and also between the usage decision and extent of 
usage decision. Our findings strongly suggest that the universal theories of optimal 
derivatives usage do not apply equally to FX and IR derivatives usage. Moreover, the 
same theories do not equally apply to the usage and extent decisions. An implication 
of our findings is that the universal theories of optimal derivatives usage need to be 
redesigned to reflect that, not only are firms’ FX and IR derivatives policies 
determined by different factors, but also that the usage and extent decisions are 
determined by different factors. 
  On our evidence, the decision to use FX derivatives is determined by firm 
size, lending support to the economies of scale theory of optimal derivatives usage. 
We find no evidence to support the theory that underinvestment costs motivate the 
FX derivatives usage decision. With respect to the costs of financial distress on the 
other hand, we find that firms with lower profitability are more likely to use FX 
derivatives. However, when it comes to the extent of FX derivatives usage, our 
evidence shows that this decision is determined by firm size, lending support to the 
economies of scale theory of optimal derivatives usage, alone.  
Likewise, the decision to use IR derivatives is determined by firm size and, 
hence, economies of scale. Again, we find no evidence that underinvestment costs 
determine the IR derivatives usage decision. However, we find strong support for 
the costs of financial distress theory of optimal derivatives usage in that firms with 
higher leverage are more likely to use IR derivatives. We also find the proportion of 
this leverage that is variable determines IR derivatives usage. On the other hand, 
when it comes to the extent of IR derivatives usage, our evidence shows that, while 
leverage and the nature of that leverage remain significant determinants, economies 
of scale are no longer so. Additionally, firms with higher profits and lower dividend 
payouts are found to use more IR derivatives, which contradict the costs of financial 
distress theory of optimal derivatives usage. Although we find no evidence to 
support the underinvestment costs theory with respect to FX derivatives usage, we 
find conflicting evidence with IR derivatives. For instance, while we find that firms 
with growth opportunities, as proxied by higher market-to-book ratios, use more IR 
 derivatives, firms with lower R&D expenditures also use more IR derivatives, 
contrary to theoretical predictions.    
One possible explanation for the determinants of firms’ FX and IR derivatives 
usage differing is due to the contrasting availability of alternatives to hedge FX and 
IR risks. For instance, a firm with IR exposure has few options but to use IR 
derivatives. On the other hand, a firm with FX exposure has a range of internal and 
external mechanisms. For example, an exporting firm could open a production 
facility in the market to which it sells its products in order to match foreign 
denominated revenues with foreign costs. Alternatively, the same exporting firm 
could borrow in the foreign currency, thereby matching expected foreign 
denominated revenues with foreign debt repayments. Thus, while foreign 
operations and foreign debt are less flexible and assured hedges than FX derivatives, 
they do highlight the likelihood that FX derivatives are nested in larger ‘suite’ of 
options than are available to hedge IR exposure. Consequently, while it is possible 
that the theory is perfectly appropriate with respect to firms’ broader hedging 
decisions, it will not be borne out by an empirical examination of derivatives usage, 
alone. Rather, one would need to examine the full range of internal and external 
mechanisms to ascertain their true determinants. Until such time as firms are 
required to comprehensively disclose their corporate risk management activities, 
this issue could be resolved by augmenting the type of empirical work carried out in 
this study with comprehensive, individual-firm case studies. 
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 Table 1. Overview of Derivatives Literature 
This table provides an overview of the literature that uses annual report disclosures to examine the determinants of firms’ 
derivatives usage. The column entitled “Scope” refers to what categories of derivatives are examined. For example, “FX and IR” 
means that study examines the determinants of FX and IR derivatives separately. “General” refers to the determinants of 
aggregate derivatives usage, or FX, IR and CP derivatives usage, combined. The last column, entitled “Model”, refers to the 
model employed to examine firms’ derivatives usage.  
 
 
 
 
 
Author(s) Sample Scope Model
Geczy et al. (1997) US FX  Logit
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) US FX  Two-part
Elliot et al. (2003) US FX OLS
Visvanathan (1998) US IR Logit
Borokhovich et al. (2004) US IR Tobit
Tufano (1996) US CP Tobit
Haushalter (2000) US CP Two-part and Tobit
Dionne and Garand (2003) US CP Tobit
Adam and Fernando (2006) US CP Two-part
Mian (1996) US FX, IR and CP Logit
Howton and Perfect (1998) US FX and IR Tobit
Gay and Nam (1998) US General Tobit
Fok et al (1997) US General Logit
Graham and Rogers (2002) US General Tobit
Knopf et al. (2002) US General Tobit
Rogers (2002) US General Tobit
Lin and Smith (2007) US General Probit
Nguyen and Faff (2002) Australia General Tobit 
Nguyen and Faff (2003) Australia FX and IR Tobit
Marsden and Prevost (2005) New Zealand General Two-part
Bartram et al. (2009) International (incl. Europe) FX, IR and CP Probit
Lel (2012) International (incl. Europe) FX Tobit
Judge (2006) UK General Logit
Muller and Verschoor (2005) Belgian, Dutch, German, UK FX Two-part
 Table 2. Summary Statistics for the Pooled Sample 
The top section shows the results of partitioning the sample by country. The second column (N) gives the total number of firm-
year observations (2009 and 2010) from each country in the final sample. The remaining columns give the frequency and 
percentage of firms that used FX and IR derivatives. The middle and bottom sections show the results of partitioning the 
sample by industry and size, respectively.  
 
 
 
N
Freq Percent Freq Percent
By Country:
Austria 60 48 80.0% 36 60.0%
Belgium 78 52 66.7% 42 53.8%
Finland 80 70 87.5% 62 77.5%
France 290 210 72.4% 231 79.7%
Germany 346 246 71.1% 225 65.0%
Ireland 56 31 55.4% 28 50.0%
Italy 178 102 57.3% 125 70.2%
Luxembourg 4 4 100.0% 2 50.0%
Netherlands 136 74 54.4% 64 47.1%
Portugal 62 22 35.5% 47 75.8%
Spain 130 58 44.6% 86 66.2%
By Industry:
Basic Materials 120 87 72.5% 72 60.0%
Consumer Goods 226 173 76.5% 157 69.5%
Consumer Services 220 127 57.7% 145 65.9%
Health Care 94 47 50.0% 50 53.2%
Industrials 454 323 71.1% 324 71.4%
Oil & Gas 64 40 62.5% 41 64.1%
Technology 140 57 40.7% 73 52.1%
Telecommunications 32 17 53.1% 22 68.8%
Utilities 70 46 65.7% 64 91.4%
By Size:
Lower Quartile 354 115 32.5% 138 39.0%
2nd Quartile 356 228 64.0% 232 65.2%
3rd Quartile 354 261 73.7% 267 75.4%
Upper Quartile 356 313 87.9% 311 87.4%
All firms 1420 917 64.6% 948 66.8%
FX derivatives users IR derivatives users
 Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. It reports the number of firm-year observations, mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, quartiles, skewness and kurtosis for each variable used in the regressions.  
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max Skewness Kurtosis
Derivative usage:
Notional General Derivatives 1257 0.183 0.247 0.000 0.016 0.109 0.252 3.135 3.511 26.586
Notional FX derivatives 1297 0.081 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.098 1.475 3.523 20.159
Notional IR derivatives 1308 0.099 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.137 3.135 6.406 78.797
Underinvestment:
Market-to-book 1387 2.115 1.851 0.081 1.074 1.600 2.499 20.632 3.838 27.087
R&D expeditures 1351 0.023 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 1.159 8.189 93.356
Capital expenditures 1412 0.041 0.038 0.000 0.017 0.031 0.053 0.316 2.439 12.349
Financial Distress:
Leverage ratio 1397 0.368 0.293 0.000 0.152 0.324 0.528 3.166 1.655 11.407
Debt maturity 1267 2.890 1.379 0.500 2.030 2.770 3.730 7.040 0.385 2.821
Operating margin 1408 0.064 0.156 -2.717 0.022 0.060 0.118 0.533 -6.703 106.099
Asset tangibility 1409 0.365 0.211 0.001 0.203 0.363 0.527 0.943 0.115 2.241
Quick ratio 1409 1.091 0.778 0.110 0.690 0.920 1.220 12.920 4.829 50.424
Dividend yield 1387 0.024 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.036 0.363 3.235 26.401
Tax loss carry forwards 1320 0.026 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.017 1.993 10.797 142.370
Size (log total assets) 1420 14.197 1.821 8.819 12.970 14.080 15.296 19.298 0.260 3.063
Managerial risk aversion:
Variable executive compensation 1229 0.333 0.231 0.000 0.140 0.330 0.510 1.000 0.179 2.094
FX exposure:
Foreign sales 1209 0.302 0.232 0.000 0.080 0.290 0.470 0.960 0.334 2.218
Foreign debt 1347 0.118 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.150 1.000 2.218 7.111
IR exposure:
Variable rate debt 860 0.590 0.354 0.000 0.270 0.620 0.990 1.000 -0.213 1.566
 Table 4. Summary of Independent Variables 
This table presents a summary of the independent variables used as proxies for the incentives to use derivatives. The column entitled “Predicted sign” indicates the directional effect that 
theory predicts the variable has on derivatives usage. A “+”  (“-“) predicts that higher (lower) values for that variable results in increased derivatives usage. The column entitled “Source” lists 
the previous studies that have used that variable as a determinant of derivatives usage. 
 
 
 
Variable Variable formula Predicted sign Source
Market-to-book Market capitalization/book value of common equity + Geczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Elliott et al. (2003), Visvanathan (1998), 
(DataStream WorldScope Items: WC08001/WC03501) Borokhovich et al. (2004), Mian (1996), Gay and Nam (1998), Nance et al. (1993, Fok et al. (1997), 
Graham and Rogers (2002), Rogers (2002), Nguyen and Faff (2002, 2003), Marsden and Prevost (2005), 
Bartram et al. (2009), Judge (2006), Muller and Verschoor (2005)
R&D expeditures R&D expenditures/total sales (WC01201/WC01001) + Dolde (1995), Geczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Elliott et al (2003), Visvanathan (1998), 
Howton and Perfect (1998), Gay and Nam (1998), Nance et al. (1993), Fok et al. (1997), 
Graham and Rogers (2002), Rogers (2002), Lin and Smith (2007), Bartram et al. (2009), Judge (2006)
Capital expenditures Capital expenditures/total sales (WC04601/WC02999) + Geczy et al. (1997), Haushalter (2000), Graham and Rogers (2002), Rogers (2002), 
Dionne and Garand (2003), Lin and Smith (2007), Bartram et al (2009), Judge (2006) 
Leverage ratio Total debt/(market capitalization + total debt + preferred stock) + Dolde (1995), Geczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Elliott et al (2003), Visvanathan (1998), 
(WC03255/(WC08001 + WC03255 + WC03451)) Borokhovich et al. (2004), Tufano (1996), Haushalter (2000), Dionne and Garand (2003), Mian (1996), 
Howton and Perfect (1998), Gay and Nam (1998), Nance et al. (1993), Fok et al. (1997), 
Graham and Rogers (2002), Rogers (2002), Lin and Smith (2007), Nguyen and Faff (2002, 2003), 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Marsden and Prevost (2005), Bartram et al. (2009), Lel (2012), 
Judge (2006), Muller and Verschoor (2005)
Debt maturity (Debt < 1 year)*0.5 + (debt 1-5 years)*3 + (remainder)*7.5 (manually gathered) +/- Visvanathan (1998), Bartram et al. (2009)
Operating margin Operating income/total sales (WC01250/WC01001) - Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Elliott et al. (2003), Rogers (2002), Bartram et al. (2009)
Asset tangibility (Inventories + PPE)/total assets ((WC02101 + WC02501)/WC02999) - Howton and Perfect (1998)
Quick ratio (Cash & equivalents + receivables)/current liabilities - Geczy et al. (1997), Borokhovich et al. (2004), Tufano (1996), Dionne and Garand (2003), Mian (1996), 
((WC02001 + WC02051)/WC02101) Nance et al. (1993), Fok et al. (1997), Graham and Rogers (2002), Rogers (2002), Lin and Smith (2007), 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Marsden and Prevost (2005), Bartram et al. (2009), Judge (2006), 
Muller and Verschoor (2005) 
Dividend yield Cash dividends/market capitalization (WC05376/WC08001) + Dolde (1995), Geczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Haushalter (2000),
Dionne and Garand (2003), Mian (1996), Nance et al. (1993), Fok et al. (1993), 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Marsden and Prevost (2005), Muller and Verschoor (2005), Judge (2006),
Bartram et al. (2009)
Tax loss carry forwards Tax loss carry forwards/total assets  (manually gathered) + Geczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Visvanathan (1998), Tufano (1996), 
Howton and Perfect (1998), Gay and Nam (1998), Nance et al. (1993), Fok et al. (1997), 
Graham and Rogers (2002), Lin and Smith (2007), Marsden and Prevost (2005), Judge (2006), 
Muller and Verschoor (2005)
Size (log total assets) LN(total assets) (WC02999) +/- Geczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Elliott et al (2003), Visvanathan (1998), 
Borokhovich et al. (2004), Tufano (1996), Haushalter (2000), Dionne and Garand (2003), Mian (1996), 
Howton and Perfect (1998), Gay and Nam (1998), Nance et al. (1993), Fok et al. (1997), 
Graham and Rogers (2002), Rogers (2002), Lin and Smith (2007), Nguyen and Faff (2002, 2003), 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Marsden and Prevost (2005), Bartram et al. (2009), Lel (2012), 
Judge (2006), Muller and Verschoor (2005)
Variable executive compensation Variable exec. comp./total exec. comp. (manually gathered) +
Foreign sales Foreign sales/total sales (manually gathered) + Geczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001),Elliott et al. (2003), Graham and Rogers (2002), 
Bartram et al. (2009), Judge (2006), Muller and Verschoor (2005)
Foreign assets Foreign assets/total assets (manually gathered) + Bartram et al. (2009)
Foreign debt Foreign debt/total debt (manually gathered) + Geczy et al. (1997), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Elliott et al. (2003), Muller and Verschoor (2005)
Variable rate debt Variable rate debt/total debt (manually gathered) + Graham and Rogers (2002)
 Table 5. Tobit Model 
This table reports the Tobit regression estimates for the pooled sample (2009 and 2010). The independent variable in the left-most model is the notional value of general derivatives, i.e. FX 
plus IR derivatives, scaled by total assets. The independent variables in the middle and right-most models are the notional values of FX and IR derivatives, respectively, scaled by total assets.  
   
 
 
General Derivatives FX Derivatives IR Derivatives
Coeff. p -value Coeff. p -value Coeff. p -value
Market-to-book 0.014b 0.030 Market-to-book -0.002 0.718 Market-to-book 0.020a 0.000
R&D expeditures -0.175 0.508 R&D expeditures 0.042 0.832 R&D expeditures -0.473c 0.096
Capital expenditures -0.288 0.350 Capital expenditures -0.268 0.282 Capital expenditures -0.273 0.316
Leverage ratio 0.120a 0.007 Leverage ratio -0.031 0.379 Leverage ratio 0.176a 0.000
Debt maturity 0.012 0.176 Debt maturity -0.005 0.491 Debt maturity 0.020
b
0.010
Operating margin 0.251
b
0.022 Operating margin -0.164
c
0.060 Operating margin 0.427
a
0.000
Asset tangibility 0.067 0.286 Asset tangibility 0.094c 0.064 Asset tangibility 0.080 0.136
Quick ratio -0.012 0.589 Quick ratio 0.014 0.408 Quick ratio -0.048b 0.013
Dividend yield -0.542 0.212 Dividend yield 0.143 0.674 Dividend yield -0.625c 0.087
Tax loss carry forwards -0.081 0.558 Tax loss carry forwards 0.113 0.299 Tax loss carry forwards -0.304
b
0.030
Size (log total assets) 0.042
a
0.000 Size (log total assets) 0.047
a
0.000 Size (log total assets) 0.022
a
0.002
Foreign sales 0.005 0.917 Foreign sales 0.168a 0.000 Foreign sales -0.108b 0.016
Foreign debt 0.046 0.372 Foreign debt 0.043 0.276 Foreign debt 0.028 0.519
Variable rate debt 0.065c 0.056 Variable rate debt -0.008 0.768 Variable rate debt 0.086a 0.003
Country dummies Yes Country dummies Yes Country dummies Yes
Industry dummies Yes Industry dummies Yes Industry dummies Yes
Year dummies Yes Year dummies Yes Year dummies Yes
N 581 N 597 N 599
Users 530 Users 407 Users 437
Non-users 51 Non-users 190 Non-users 162
Log likelihood -4.823 Log likelihood 35.705 Log likelihood 5.245
LR chi
2
162.32
a
LR chi
2
249.80
a
LR chi
2
156.85
a
a, b and c denote significance at <1%, <5% and 10%
       Tobit        Tobit        Tobit
 Table 6. Two-Part Model 
This table reports the two-part model regression estimates for the pooled sample (2009 and 2010). The first step examines the binary usage decision with a probit model where the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (derivatives users = 1, non-users = 0). The second step examines the extent of usage decision with a truncated OLS regression in which only 
those firms who report a non-zero notional amount of FX derivatives are included. The left-most model examines the usage and extent of usage of general derivatives, i.e. FX plus IR 
derivatives. The middle and right-most models examine the usage and extent of usage of FX and IR derivatives, respectively.  
 
 
 
General Derivatives FX Derivatives IR Derivatives
Coeff. p -value Coeff. p -value Coeff. p -value Coeff. p -value Coeff. p -value Coeff. p -value
Market-to-book 0.028 0.658 0.015
b
0.024 Market-to-book 0.040 0.337 -0.005 0.441 Market-to-book -0.027 0.512 0.029
a
0.000
R&D expeditures -2.246 0.429 -0.055 0.869 R&D expeditures -1.008 0.528 0.413 0.240 R&D expeditures -0.220 0.896 -0.644
b
0.023
Capital expenditures 2.011 0.648 -0.404 0.198 Capital expenditures -1.072 0.569 -0.292 0.312 Capital expenditures -2.315 0.300 -0.085 0.754
Leverage ratio -0.291 0.558 0.152
a
0.001 Leverage ratio -0.557
c
0.053 0.016 0.674 Leverage ratio 0.526
b
0.049 0.185
a
0.000
Debt maturity 0.006 0.954 0.017
c
0.084 Debt maturity -0.090 0.135 0.001 0.881 Debt maturity 0.133
b
0.020 0.015
c
0.070
Operating margin -2.331
c
0.058 0.348
a
0.002 Operating margin -1.348
b
0.042 -0.076 0.435 Operating margin -0.089 0.910 0.522
a
0.000
Asset tangibility 2.415
a
0.003 -0.016 0.823 Asset tangibility 1.078
a
0.007 0.005 0.930 Asset tangibility 1.876
a
0.000 -0.089 0.101
Quick ratio -0.220 0.419 -0.005 0.823 Quick ratio -0.021 0.887 0.018 0.336 Quick ratio -0.478a 0.001 -0.005 0.792
Dividend yield 8.709 0.184 -0.746c 0.088 Dividend yield 1.289 0.667 0.114 0.753 Dividend yield 2.203 0.482 -0.757b 0.028
Tax loss carry forwards 0.568 0.733 -0.113 0.421 Tax loss carry forwards 1.376c 0.082 0.003 0.981 Tax loss carry forwards -1.851b 0.040 0.018 0.922
Size (log total assets) 0.931a 0.000 0.020b 0.023 Size (log total assets) 0.488a 0.000 0.016b 0.037 Size (log total assets) 0.378a 0.000 -0.006 0.390
Foreign sales 1.042 0.198 -0.040 0.454 Foreign sales 1.718a 0.000 0.039 0.396 Foreign sales -0.195 0.579 -0.072 0.105
Foreign debt 1.248c 0.087 0.054 0.303 Foreign debt 0.538 0.147 0.017 0.681 Foreign debt 0.312 0.362 0.040 0.373
Variable rate debt 1.150a 0.005 0.029 0.410 Variable rate debt 0.230 0.315 -0.040 0.160 Variable rate debt 0.473b 0.033 0.058c 0.050
Country dummies Yes Yes Country dummies Yes Yes Country dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Industry dummies Yes Yes Industry dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes Year dummies Yes Yes
N 571 N 593 N 593
Log likelihood -82.817 Log likelihood -253.702 Log likelihood -254.413
LR chi2 178.05a LR chi2 236.43a LR chi2 186.65a
N 530 N 407 N 437
F 4.16
a
F 3.44
a
F 4.52
a
R2 0.217 R2 0.233 R2 0.270
Adj R2 0.165 Adj R2 0.165 Adj R2 0.210
a, b and c denote significance at <1%, <5% and 10%
           1st Step Probit            2nd Step Trunc OLS            1st Step Probit            2nd Step Trunc OLS            1st Step Probit            2nd Step Trunc OLS 
 Table 7. Heckman Model 
This table reports the Heckman model regression estimates for the pooled sample (2009 and 2010). The first step examines the binary usage decision with a probit model where the 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (derivatives users = 1, non-users = 0). The predicted probabilities of derivatives usage are retained for each observation and an inverse Mills 
ratio is calculated for each, which is included as an additional explanatory variable in the second step, which is a truncated OLS regression in which only those firms who report a non-zero 
notional amount of FX derivatives are included. The left-most model examines the usage and extent of usage of general derivatives, i.e. FX plus IR derivatives. The middle and right-most 
models examine the usage and extent of usage of FX and IR derivatives, respectively.  
 
 
 
General Derivatives FX Derivatives IR Derivatives
Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig.
Market-to-book 0.121 0.170 0.016b 0.022 Market-to-book 0.046 0.296 -0.007 0.273 Market-to-book 0.003 0.944 0.030a 0.000
R&D expeditures -6.518c 0.053 -0.116 0.734 R&D expeditures -1.915 0.294 0.414 0.249 R&D expeditures -2.345 0.283 -0.763a 0.008
Capital expenditures 1.026 0.822 -0.424 0.193 Capital expenditures -0.871 0.660 -0.372 0.226 Capital expenditures -0.903 0.722 -0.146 0.597
Leverage ratio 1.290c 0.068 0.165a 0.001 Leverage ratio -0.377 0.229 0.018 0.646 Leverage ratio 0.667b 0.032 0.194a 0.000
Debt maturity -0.036 0.747 0.024b 0.014 Debt maturity -0.105 0.107 0.001 0.945 Debt maturity 0.174a 0.006 0.023b 0.013
Operating margin -3.833
a
0.009 0.361
a
0.002 Operating margin -1.524
b
0.029 -0.076 0.479 Operating margin -0.979 0.280 0.500
a
0.000
Asset tangibility 2.178
b
0.014 0.019 0.776 Asset tangibility 1.084
a
0.009 0.076 0.262 Asset tangibility 1.803
a
0.000 -0.041 0.526
Quick ratio -0.038 0.909 -0.023 0.379 Quick ratio -0.018 0.904 0.011 0.571 Quick ratio -0.452
a
0.004 -0.026 0.257
Dividend yield 5.805 0.391 -0.928b 0.033 Dividend yield 0.219 0.942 -0.052 0.887 Dividend yield 1.701 0.600 -0.793b 0.022
Tax loss carry forwards 0.358 0.866 -0.122 0.379 Tax loss carry forwards 1.245 0.128 0.014 0.910 Tax loss carry forwards -2.016b 0.031 -0.077 0.682
Size (log total assets) 0.801a 0.000 0.018c 0.065 Size (log total assets) 0.458a 0.000 0.026c 0.080 Size (log total assets) 0.347a 0.000 -0.001 0.937
Foreign sales 0.922 0.297 -0.033 0.566 Foreign sales 1.823a 0.000 0.064 0.384 Foreign sales -0.263 0.498 -0.074 0.122
Foreign debt 0.633 0.419 0.048 0.365 Foreign debt 0.407 0.284 0.033 0.437 Foreign debt 0.171 0.638 0.036 0.441
Variable rate debt 1.037
b
0.028 0.029 0.429 Variable rate debt 0.254 0.296 -0.034 0.283 Variable rate debt 0.571
b
0.019 0.073
b
0.025
Variable executive compensation 1.586 0.104 Variable executive compensation 0.461 0.213 Variable executive compensation 0.378 0.325
Inverse mills ratio 0.024 0.747 Inverse mills ratio 0.073 0.351 Inverse mills ratio 0.067 0.267
Country dummies yes yes Country dummies yes yes Country dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes Industry dummies yes yes Industry dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes Year dummies yes yes Year dummies yes yes
N N N
Censored Censored Censored 
Uncencored Uncencored Uncencored
Wald Chi
2
Wald Chi
2
Wald Chi
2
a, b and c denote significance at <1%, <5% and 10%
410
151.77
a
1st Step Probit 2nd Step Trunc OLS 
551
141
150.99
a
1st Step Probit 2nd Step Trunc OLS 
550
172
378
1st Step Probit 2nd Step Trunc OLS 
535
43
492
100.65
a
 Figure 1. Model Selection 
 
 
 
One step decision 
process 
Corner solution 
(censored data) 
Tobit model 
Two step decision 
process 
Incidentally 
truncated data 
Sample selection   
(εi and ui are 
dependent)  
Heckman model 
No sample 
selection (εi and ui 
are independent)  
Two part model 
